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The Public Funding of Health Care: A Brief Historical Overview of
Principles, Practices, and Motives
Abstract
Nationally sponsored programs designed to fund health care for the general public are largely a twentieth
century phenomenon. Yet a long glance backward at the medical and public health history of Western
civilization, extending from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century, reveals earlier periods when
governments, religious institutions, and other groups provided some measure of medical relief for the sick, the
poor, and the homeless. In this essay, I will provide not an exhaustive but rather an illustrative account of this
oft forgotten fact. My objectives are threefold.
First, to remind us that the active concern of society for the health of its citizens is hardly a new development
arising full born, as it were, out of the biomedical revolution and refined moral sensibilities of our present age.
As I will suggest, our current interest in public health, and the related question of how to allocate medical
resources fairly, is part of a larger evolutionary social process. Second, to conjecture that the impulse of caring
for the sick and injured, using public or private resources,1 is typically driven by a variety of sometimes
overlapping motivations, both religious and secular in origin. Third, to indicate that no single monolithic
philosophy of providing medical care for the masses emerges from the historical record. That is, no unified
pattern of health care organization or individual or communal motivation can plausibly account for this
seemingly altruistic behavior, behavior which is putatively aimed at promoting the common good of all
members of society.
Given the interdisciplinary scope of this discussion, my inquiry will weave together sociological,
psychological, and philosophical strands of evidence. Constraints of length will limit us primarily to
developments in Europe and the United States. In the end, a limited sampling of societal practices, individual
or communal motivations, and philosophical considerations will indicate that no simple story can be told
about the public or private funding of health care.
Proceeding more or less chronologically, I will introduce evidence demonstrating that redemptive, utilitarian,
prudential, and charitable impulses (among others) are at work in the humane decision to use public or
private funds to provide medical care for the benefit of the sick or infirm. While I do not claim that these four
motivations constitute a complete list, they do emerge as a recurring and significant typology — helping to
solidify the emerging modern public health movement in England, the United States, and elsewhere in the
West by the late nineteenth century.
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Old age is a natural disease, while disease is an acquired old age. (Aristotle, 
Generation of Animals 5.49.784b.33)
Introduction
Nationally sponsored programs designed to fund health care for the 
general public are largely a twentieth century phenomenon. Yet a long 
glance backward at the medical and public health history of Western 
civilization, extending from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century, 
reveals earlier periods when governments, religious institutions, and 
other groups provided some measure of medical relief for the sick, the 
poor, and the homeless. In this essay, I will provide not an exhaustive 
but rather an illustrative account of this oft forgotten fact. My objectives 
are threefold.
First, to remind us that the active concern of society for the health of its 
citizens is hardly a new development arising full born, as it were, out of 
the biomedical revolution and refined moral sensibilities of our present 
age. As I will suggest, our current interest in public health, and the 
related question of how to allocate medical resources fairly, is part of a 
larger evolutionary social process. Second, to conjecture that the 
impulse of caring for the sick and injured, using public or private 
resources,1 is typically driven by a variety of sometimes overlapping
] The phrase 'public or private resources' is used advisedly. There are relatively 
few well documented cases prior to about 1850 when public funds alone went 
toward rendering medical care to the sick or infirm. More typically, such efforts 
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motivations, both religious and secular in origin. Third, to indicate that 
no single monolithic philosophy of providing medical care for the 
masses emerges from the historical record. That is, no unified pattern of 
health care organization or individual or communal motivation can 
plausibly account for this seemingly altruistic behavior, behavior which 
is putatively aimed at promoting the common good of all members of 
society.
Given the interdisciplinary scope of this discussion, my inquiry will 
weave together sociological, psychological, and philosophical strands 
of evidence. Constraints of length will limit us primarily to develop­
ments in Europe and the United States. In the end, a limited sampling of 
societal practices, individual or communal motivations, and philosoph­
ical considerations will indicate that no simple story can be told about 
the public or private funding of health care.
Proceeding more or less chronologically, I will introduce evidence 
demonstrating that redemptive, utilitarian, prudential, and charitable 
impulses (among others) are at work in the humane decision to use pub­
lic or private funds to provide medical care for the benefit of the sick or 
infirm. While I do not claim that these four motivations constitute a 
complete list, they do emerge as a recurring and significant typology — 
helping to solidify the emerging modern public health movement in 
England, the United States, and elsewhere in the West by the late nine­
teenth century.
The Public Health Movement and Distributive Justice
Struggling to survive amidst the social upheaval of the Industrial Revo­
lution from about 1750 and well into the next century, peasants, labour­
ers, share-croppers and others migrated from rural to urban areas—first 
in Europe and later in America —in search of a better life and regular 
employment. Instead, workers were routinely paid subsistence wages 
and laboured twelve to sixteen hour days in grinding, suffocating facto­
ries and other industrial environments in cities like Manchester, Liver­
pool, Chicago, and Boston. What's more, the unwashed masses were 
frequently shunted into crowded, unsanitary tenements in major eco­
nomic centres such as Paris, London, and New York. Not surprisingly, 
the poor, hungry, and homeless were usually the hardest hit by infec­
tious (communicable) diseases and other debilitating ailments. In fact, 
their miseries were redoubled by overcrowded tenement housing in the 
larger cities by the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the 
nineteenth century as well. These squalid living and working conditions 
contributed to new levels of urban blight and the inevitable spread of
involved funds from both the wealthier classes, acting charitably, and from 
governmental sources, acting prudentially. 
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infectious diseases like cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, smallpox, yel­
low fever, and measles.
Indeed, the modern public health movement may be understood, in 
part, as a humane response to the collective misery brought about by the 
Industrial Revolution and its introduction of steam power to run the 
massive factory machines, and by the population shifts which it pro­
voked as workers were lured from country farms and villages to, in 
effect, become willing cogs in those often dehumanizing machines. The 
public health ethos represents a response on the part of doctors, nurses, 
city officials, clergy, and governmental leaders who personally or pro­
fessionally cared about the future of their cities and towns. Understand­
ably, they cared, too, about the preservation of their own and their 
families' and their communities' health in the face of these profound 
demographic migrations and accompanying threat of the outbreak of 
epidemic diseases that left no one feeling secure. In addition, poor per­
sonal hygiene, foul drinking water, spoiled food, lack of sanitation, 
putrid air — these and other factors were also commonly thought to be 
involved in undermining the health of the masses. However prejudicial 
or misleading, the views of a growing cohort of public health officials 
held sway with the establishment as their opinions were echoed in 
newspapers and summarized in public health notices posted publicly 
during the 1800 and 1900s in both England and the United States, 
according to social historian Roy Porter (Porter, 1999, pp. 397-427 pas­
sim).
Hence, by the opening decades of the 1800s some reasonably helpful 
public health measures were deployed. These included educational 
tracts about the importance of personal hygiene (cleanliness, it turns out, 
really was next to godliness); church sponsored kitchens for the care and 
feeding of the displaced and the poor; and early feminist social cam­
paigns that stressed the need for improved sanitation. These efforts cul­
minated in the so-called 'sanitation movement' that lobbied for closed 
sewers, potable drinking water, and other important environmental 
reforms. In addition, many churches and other religious organizations 
sponsored sermons aimed specifically at the poor, widowed, and 
orphaned. These stressed the need for 'good work habits', 'clean mor­
als', regular bathing or, if needed, de-licing, medical examinations, etc. 
To be sure, however mixed the overall results were in actually protect­
ing lives against infectious diseases like cholera and smallpox, such pub­
lic health measures did indeed cost the state and other sponsoring 
organizations money. While most of the revenues to cover these costs 
came from government treasuries, other funding derived from such 
non-governmental entities as churches, guilds, professional societies, 
and wealthy families. The latter tended to view their contributions as a 
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civic or religious duty if not also as an insurance policy against class war­
fare.
Furthermore, by the middle of the nineteenth century, what could be 
called the emerging public health movement and its tacit commitment to 
promote sound hygiene and public sanitation for all, began slowly to be 
codified into law. In England, this reform was embodied in three key 
pieces of legislation.
First, the (revised) New Poor Law of 1834. This was encouraged by the 
utilitarian reformer and founder of the Sanitary Movement in Britain, 
Edwin Chadwick (1800-90). Among other things, the law created a sin­
gle scale of benefit to the poor across England, without local variations 
(Chave, 1984, p. 5). It also provided subsistence, medicine, work, and 
crude housing for the indigent but able-bodied poor who, 
unsurprisingly, suffered in disproportionate numbers from a variety of 
chronic and debilitating diseases. But Chadwick came to see that the 
revised workhouse conditions created by the New Poor Law, a law that 
was actually intended to reduce the number of families on public relief 
by creating harsh workhouse conditions involving the separation of 
families, long hours of employment, and the lowest possible pay, in 
point of fact increased the number of families seeking subsistence 
wages. This puzzled him. He studied the situation in great detail, culmi­
nating in his monumental Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain (1842). This report to Parliament documented, 
among other things, that not fecklessness or sloth (as he and others had 
heretofore ruefully claimed) but rather disease and disability were over­
whelmingly the primary causes of poverty. In addition, to overcome 
these unhealthy conditions, actions needed to be taken by municipal 
governments to provide clean drinking water, rid towns and cities of 
cesspools and piles of garbage that bred disease, and eventually estab­
lish oversight and enforcement mechanisms. Disturbingly, Chadwick's 
report showed that the average age of death for the poorest laborer in 
London's worst slums was 16, while the better-off laborer lived to about 
age forty-five. 'Poverty could not be abolished, but the poverty due to 
preventable diseases could be', Chadwick declared. Given his powers of 
persuasion and careful documentation, he convinced Parliament that 
the situation among the urban poor was indeed dire (Porter, 1999, p. 
411).
Second, this sense of urgency led to the passage of the England's first 
Public Health Act of 1848. This act created a central governmental 
authority, the General Board of Health. It compelled all cities and towns 
to establish boards of health responsible for implementing and enforc­
ing sanitary conditions for drainage, water, garbage removal, housing, 
waste disposal, and the regulation of 'offensive trades' like butchering, 
slaughtering, tanning, etc. Shortly thereafter, in 1849, an English physi­
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cian and epidemiologist by the name of John Snow (1813-1858), tested 
this law. He published his controversial On the Mode of Communication of 
Cholera. 'Questioning [Chadwick's preferred] miasmatism, he argued 
that cholera could not be spread by a poison in the ambient air [as had 
been widely held], since it affected the intestines not the lung" (Porter, 
1999, p. 413). In fact, Snow suspected that cholera was not a contagion at 
all but rather a water-borne disease. A significant breakthrough 
occurred in August of 1854, when Snow traced 93 local cholera deaths to 
a single source, namely, contaminated drinking water drawn from Lon­
don's Broad Street Pump. Snow moved quickly. On September 7th, he 
persuaded the Board of Guardians in Soho to remove the offending 
pump. The Board was at first skeptical but reluctantly agreed. Within 
months, local cholera deaths in Soho dropped precipitously. Thus, 
Snow's theory was confirmed in no small measure due to his persistent 
detective work and the regulatory governing structure created by the 
aforementioned Public Health Act of 1848 (Porter, 1999, pp. 412-3). 
Interestingly, in France the work of Louis Rene Villerme (1782-1863) 
almost paralleled the statistical conclusions of Chadwick. In fact, 
Villerme's ' ... morbidity and mortality statistics also demonstrated a 
close correlation between health and living standards, and led the 
French government to establish a national public health advisory com­
mittee in 1848' (Duffy, 2004, p. 2207).
Third, there was the further development in England of legislation 
leading to yet another consolidating piece of legislation designed to for­
tify public health regulations.
The sanitary legislation developed since 1848 was consolidated in the codify­
ing Public Health Act of 1875, requiring the appointment of a medical officer 
of health to every sanitary district in England and Wales, while the Poor Law 
and public health administration were amalgamated in 1872 in the Local 
Government Board. [Hence], the medical expert's role in public administra­
tion had been established, and local government had acquired extensive pub­
lic health powers (Porter, 1999, p. 414).
And so the Public Health Act of 1875 formally and systematically 
acknowledged the role of government to provide minimal levels of sani­
tation and sound hygiene for all citizens. This astonishing moral, social, 
and scientifically informed commitment, based on the realization that 
the strength of society as a whole depends on the sound health of all its 
citizens, eventually paved the way in Britain to the establishment of the 
National Health Service by 1948, and in the United States to the estab­
lishment of the National Institutes of Health, during that same year. 
Coincidentally, the World Health Organization of the United Nations, 
dedicated to eradicating disease and stopping pandemics wherever 
they occur, was also established in 1948.
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But compared to Great Britain, the rise of the public health movement 
in the United States developed at a somewhat slower pace. This was due 
in part to the fact that England was the first country in Europe to experi­
ence the displacing and dehumanizing social effects of the factory sys­
tem. Then, too, the United States was a younger nation. Her westward 
expansion by rail from New York to California was not complete until 
about 1890, and steam power took a little longer than in England to be 
adapted for factory use. In due time, her major cities began to swell first 
with displaced labourers and farmers looking to improve their lot in the 
cities, and then with European and Asian immigrants seeking the 
greater economic opportunities promised by the American experiment. 
Hence, by the mid to late 1800s, this led to sanitation and related urban 
problems associated with overcrowding, squalid tenement conditions, 
and generally overwrought infrastructure. The rates of morbidity and 
mortality began to rise, especially in the larger cities. Medical historian 
John Duffy expands:
The movement to remedy these conditions was initiated largely by physi­
cians, most notably Benjamin W. McCready, whose 1837 essay drew atten­
tion to the deplorable health conditions in the workplace and the slum 
housing the workers, and [also] by John H. Griscom, whose 1845 report, The 
Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of New York, laid the basis for 
establishing the first effective municipal health department in the United 
States. [Another] ... outstanding layman of the early health movement was 
Lemuel Shattuck of Boston, who pioneered in the collection of vital statistics 
and promoted sanitary reform ... As in England, the public health movement 
was both a humanitarian and moral crusade. A few reformers emphasized 
improving the morals of the poor. [B]ut most recognized that immorality and 
intemperance were closely associated with the crowded and brutally 
degraded living conditions of the poor (Duffy, 2004, p. 2206).
Thus, America's first National Board of Health was instituted in 1879. 
This occurred largely in response to the terrifying yellow fever epidemic 
of 1878 which spread like wildfire across state lines. In particular, yellow 
fever took its human toll up and down the Mississippi River. It was 
thought to be carried by commercial steamboats and their crews that 
plied the muddy waters from New Orleans to St. Louis. This outbreak 
killed over 50% of the people in some places. (Porter, 1999, p. 418) With 
the germ theory of disease (demonstrated in 1878 by Louis Pasteur, and 
expanded in 1882 by his arch rival Robert Koch) now equipping 
state-sponsored public health functions with a plausible new rationale 
for the scientific treatment and eradication of disease, 'the USA was 
active in setting up publicly supported bacteriological laboratories for 
disease diagnosis and control' by the last decades of the nineteenth cen­
tury (Porter, 1999, p. 419). Partly as a result of this social upheaval and 
this revolutionary aspect of disease diagnosis, the role of the federal 
government expanded to include the coordination of state health 
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boards. These entities typically consisted of a patchwork quilt of local 
and regional offices usually run by political appointees and overseen by 
at least one medical doctor. In 1912, President Theodore Roosevelt 
(1858-1919) acted decisively to bring these bodies into greater harmony 
with each other and with the public they aimed to protect. Specifically, 
he transformed the Marine Hospital Service, then under the limited 
authority of the surgeon-general, into the more powerful United States 
Public Health Service.
From this point forward, there was no turning back politically or 
philosophically. The federal government would increasingly play a crit­
ical role in monitoring and regulating health care standards throughout 
the United States. It would use public funds to achieve these goals and, 
at the same time, work in consultation with one of the most powerful 
professional lobbies ever established on the American scene, namely, 
the venerable American Medical Association (first established in 1847, 
and followed in 1872 by the establishment of the American Public 
Health Association).
What's more, during the 'New Deal' reforms of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (1882-1945) in the 1930s, a series of public health laws were 
adopted that further expanded the federal government's responsibility 
for the health and welfare of its citizens.
From June 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration promoted 
rural sanitation and participated in schemes to control malaria and other dis­
eases. Also, the Public Works Administration built hospitals and contributed 
to other public health projects. In 1935 the Social Security Act authorized the 
use of federal funds for crippled children, maternity and child care, and the 
promotion of state and local public health agencies (Porter, 1999, pp. 646-7).
But in 1945, John Duffy recalls that when President Harry Truman 
(1884-1972) proposed a national health insurance program, he ignited 
the ire of the powerful AMA which promptly denounced it as 'socialized 
medicine', something mainstream Americans felt skittish about since, at 
worst, it smacked of Soviet-like state control of people's lives and 
seemed to threaten their personal privacy. Moreover, in 1948, when Tru­
man again made national health insurance a campaign issue, the AMA 
hired a powerful public relations agency and activated a speaker's 
bureau to defeat this measure — dubiously claiming that national health 
insurance would lead to a failure of medical services similar to Britain's 
bureaucratic behemoth. Nevertheless, the AMA reluctantly ceded to the 
Kerr-Mill bill, 'providing limited federal funds to help states pay for 
medical costs of the aged' (Duffy, 1993, p. 322).
In addition, during President Dwight Eisenhower's (1890-1969) 
administration of the 1950s, a central cabinet level office—the Depart­
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare —was established. It brought 
greater order and accountability to what had hitherto been only a loose 
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association of multiple federal and state agencies. Collectively, these 1 
regulatory and enforcement agencies would now be anchored in Wash- I 
ington DC. They would continue to carry out their growing responsibili­
ties, including public health services such as public education programs 
aimed at curbing alcohol abuse and cigarette smoking, along with the 
regulation of health and safety conditions in schools and factories, and 
the oversight of the safety and efficacy of food and drugs.
Later on, by the mid-1960s, the Democratic Party renewed its drive for 
a national health insurance program that Truman had earlier champi- I 
oned but failed to implement. John Duffy recalls that although the AMA 
was unsuccessful in blocking this second effort, it did manage to weaken 
its scope. So, in 1965, the Social Security laws were amended and 
Medicare and Medicaid became a reality. Medicare, which took effect in 
1966, provided hospital and medical services to citizens who reached 
the age of sixty five. In contrast, Medicaid allocated federal assistance to 
state medical programs for the indigent poor. In sum, while Medicare 
made no attempt at a wholesale restructuring of the American 
healthcare system, it more than symbolized 'that the public would 
henceforth have a voice in determining the nation's health policy' ' 
(Duffy, 1993, p. 322.).
To be sure, just how one defines 'public health', or the allied concept, 
'medical care', is of critical importance. Let's pause to clarify these key 
concepts.2 By 'medical care', I mean the use of any diagnostic, therapeu­
tic, or prognostic tool, treatment, or service adopted by qualified healers 
in a given society. Although the therapies of these healers may change 
over time, it is essential that they are believed to be conducive to the res­
toration or preservation of health. For example, in 400 BC Athens, the use 
of leeches to stop bleeding from a wound or infection would qualify as 
medical care on this definition. But merely supplying to a soldier a well 
fitting saddle for his horse, would not. For in this latter case there is no 
medical treatment involved per se, no real therapy—even though the 
saddle doubtlessly does contribute to the health and safety of both rider 
and horse.
[2] In some cases, these concepts overlap in actual usage even though they retain 
their distinct meanings. Such ambiguities are usually resolved by paying 
attention to the contexts of use.
In contrast, 'public health' may be more broadly defined. John Duffy 
calls it'... the collective action by a community or society to protect and 
promote the health and welfare of its members' (Duffy, 2004, p. 2206). 
Note that under this definition, the supply of a properly fitting saddle 
may very well qualify as a public health measure, assuming this was 
made available to other citizens, too. In addition, physician and public 
health historian George Rosen observes that 
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the major problems of health ... have been concerned with community life, 
for instance, the control of transmissible disease, the control and improve­
ment of the physical environment (sanitation), the provision of water and 
food of good quality and in sufficient supply, the provision of medical care, 
and the relief of disability and destitution. The relative emphasis placed on 
each of these problems has varied from time to time, but they are all closely 
related, and from them has come [the notion of] public health as we know it 
today (Rosen, 1958, p. 25, my emphasis).
Given Rosen's orientation, which I am inclined to adopt, what are 
some related guiding principles or perspectives regularly associated 
with the field of public health today? At least three elements deserve our 
special attention.
First, the community health perspective is a key element in helping us 
understand the history and political influence of this field. It states that 
the health or disease of an individual citizen is, to some degree, the 
proper concern and responsibility of the larger community or govern­
ment within which he or she lives and works. Notwithstanding the 
swaths of evidence from previous centuries that we will be exploring, 
the acceptance by many progressive governments during the twentieth 
century of some level of responsibility for the health of citizens consti­
tutes a significant social and political commitment not matched in ear­
lier epochs. Consider two examples: Plato, from antiquity, and Thomas 
More, from the Renaissance. They envisioned nothing even approach­
ing a comprehensive community health perspective in their writings. 
Granted, in his Republic, Plato (427-347 BC) did criticize physicians who 
futilely treated their terminal patients, thereby implicitly bilking them 
and draining the medical resources of the state. But he nowhere system­
atically tackles the question of distributive justice in connection with the 
allocation of medical resources (Carrick, 2001, p. 7). Nor would such a 
question have naturally occurred to him: it was just assumed in ancient 
Greece that matters of personal health were not subject to interference or 
regulation by the state.
Similarly, Thomas More (1478-1535), in his imaginative treatise Uto­
pia, advocated a limited public role for physicians in the lives of his citi­
zens. He, too, implicitly emphasized that each person needed to accept 
responsibility for the state of his or her own health. Granted, More did 
advocate the option of voluntary euthanasia so that the terminally ill or 
decrepit could find some appropriate end to their suffering in the inglo­
rious winter of their lives. But, again, neither Plato nor More entertained 
anything like a government directed public health ethos of the sort we 
are investigating.
Ironically, that formidable vision issued, with mixed results, from the 
pen of the nineteenth century social revolutionary Karl Marx (1818-83), 
and his capitalist backer, Friedrich Engels (1820-95). It is easy to forget 
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that in Marx's provocative Communist Manifesto he held out the hope for 
social equality for all workers. He implied too that when the bourgeoisie 
and capitalism were overthrown by violent revolution, then the class 
distinctions that created double standards and inadequate systems of 
education and possibly health care would also be a thing of the past 
(Marx, 1848, pp. 47-50 passim). Hence, the Marxist-inspired institutions 
of pre-1992 Russia under the former Soviet Union, arguably adminis­
tered the most extensive state-controlled public health care system in 
medical history. By most accounts, this resulted in a notoriously uneven, 
impersonal, and sometimes inhumane system of medical services for 
Soviet citizens (particularly in the areas of psychiatric, maternal, and 
geriatric medicine).3
[31 For more on medical abuses within the Soviet Union see Bloch and Reddawy 
(1984).
[4] This principle may be seen as an expansion of the harm principle, according to 
which individual liberty is justifiably limited only if it prevents harm to others. 
According to John Stuart Mill (1806-73) in his On Liberty, this is the sole legitimate 
principle that would warrant government to restrict the liberty of citizens. Mill 
would resist any expansion of the harm principle, and would view the principle 
of moral legalism as going too far by authorizing the state to engage in 
paternalistic practices which it has no business doing (Mill, 1859,1971).
Second, returning to our central discussion, I find that beyond the 
community health perspective just mentioned there is something that 
could be called the holistic health perspective. This constitutes another 
essential element in the field of public health. It states that an individ­
ual's health properly concerns not simply her personal factors like exer­
cise, diet, or genetic heritage. It also involves much larger societal factors 
such as adequate sanitation, decent housing, workplace safety, clean air 
and water, and a host of related external environmental factors. Holisti­
cally considered, these external, non-personal factors that contribute to a 
citizen's overall health are seen as the government's responsibility to 
develop and regulate, in accord with what is judged to be in the best 
interests of the people.
Third, philosophers, theologians, social reformers, and public health 
professionals, among others, will recognize the contentious role that the 
philosophical principle of 'moral legalism' has sometimes played in 
attempting to promote a healthier society. This is the third element of the 
public health movement. In many ways, it is the most controversial and 
contentious. Moral legalism is a liberty-limiting principle. It states that 
there is a moral duty on the part of governments to enact laws that 
would prohibit objectionable behaviour, especially behaviour that, if 
left unchecked, would pollute, harm, or disgrace the larger community.4 
Anthropologically, moral legalism is said to have its root in the ancient 
human tendencies to label, ostracize, or banish members of a society as 
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'outcasts' who break taboos or allegedly pollute others by carrying out 
behaviours deemed harmful to the tribe (Beauchamp, 2004, p. 2231.)
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, such behaviours as the 
over-consumption of alcohol, cigarette or marijuana smoking, and 
homosexual or inter-racial marriage have, at various times, been judged 
'morally objectionable' and been proscribed — in part, by appealing to 
the principle of moral legalism. Moreover, this liberty-limiting principle 
is sometimes also in the air when legislators and other architects of pub­
lic policy try to ascertain what commonly held moral intuitions of their 
constituents, supplemented by the best scientific insights, would plausi­
bly justify laws aiming to promote the public health and common good 
of society.
Consider an example: would requiring food handlers to thoroughly 
wash their hands every thirty minutes constitute a sound public health 
law? Or is this requirement too stringent and ultimately unenforceable? 
Obviously, any such deliberation within a democratic framework needs 
to be carefully balanced. On one hand, there is the constitutionally guar­
anteed (and potentially reckless) liberty-right of the individual citizen to 
be left alone to pursue life, liberty, and happiness (even if, in some cases, 
the citizen does things that are technically legal but offensive to others). 
On the other hand, there is the paternalistic (and potentially overzeal- 
ous) duty and responsibility of the state to protect its citizens and affirm 
its vision of the common good. In this capacity, it may of course pro­
scribe behaviours it deems harmful to the body politic. Therefore, con­
cepts and schemes for promoting public health intersect in natural ways 
with higher order moral issues such as 'distributive justice'. For exam­
ple, in a public health situation, consider this question: who ought to 
receive life prolonging heart or lung transplants when there may not be 
enough donor organs to go around for all those in need?
Lastly, what standards of social harmony and fair play ought we as 
philosophers, politicians, public policy analysts, legislators, and 
informed citizens to use when determining precisely what a just health 
care system should look like? Obviously, this is both a moral and legal 
question—and a question of great political and humanitarian intrigue in 
the United States where, astonishingly, nearly 20% of the population 
carries no health insurance whatsoever.
These and related social justice topics are taken up with considerable 
energy and insight in the ensuing chapters of this volume. It is my con­
tention that almost all such medically-related social justice questions are 
either rooted in, or can be shown to be anticipated by, the public health 
movement we are examining. But before proceeding any further, I 
would like to affirm Daniel Beauchamp's instructive list of four goals 
that any sound philosophy of public health must aim to accomplish.
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1. A philosophy of public health must give a central place to the unique 
approach and method of public health, with its distinctive emphasis on com­
munity, and on the central role of the scientific method in formulating courses 
of action for social improvement.
2. A philosophy of public health must give priority to prevention, and must 
challenge and revise explanations for health problems with the community 
perspective, which is essential to effective prevention.
3. A philosophy of public health must set out and defend an adequate defini­
tion of the common good, taking into account public health's pursuit of the 
common well-being — measured in terms of rates of disease and early 
death — as the object of group or common action.
4. While the philosophy of public health must acknowledge the claims of 
individual autonomy and justify actions that limit liberty and autonomy, it 
must do so in a way that leaves the community perspective and the common 
good intact (Beauchamp, 2004, p. 2211).
Let us turn, then, to some of the more significant pages of that long his­
tory. Our goal will be met if we locate and analyse several distinct occa­
sions when redemptive, utilitarian, prudential, or charitable motives 
worked to provide a measure of funding aimed at helping to preserve or 
restore the general health of citizens.
The Redemptive Motive and Funding Hospitals
Today, we may rightly think of major hospitals as largely secular institu­
tions; as showcases of scientific medicine aimed at restoring or prolong­
ing human life by using the latest high tech therapies against the ravages 
of disease or hardships of injury; and, in America and elsewhere in the 
developed world, as largely public institutions receiving large portions 
of their revenues from government grants, matching funds, or reim­
bursements.
But among the earliest hospitals in the West were religious institu­
tions and these were decidedly low tech. Their funding was generally 
not from governments, and their caregivers and sponsors were ani­
mated, at least in part, by the redemptive motive to care for the sick and 
suffering as God had ordained. By 'redemptive motive', I mean that an 
agent is acting in such a way that he earnestly believes that his action will 
elevate his soul in the eyes of heaven. This occurs by cancelling a per­
sonal sin or earning merit from the deity in accord with the specific 
prophesies or rituals of a particular religious tradition.
To illustrate, early Christian hospitals arose largely within the social 
milieu of religiously minded men and women who, in their personal 
acts of attending to the sick, were also seeking to fulfil God's word. Was 
not Christ portrayed in the Gospels (see especially Luke) as a healer of the 
poor, one who restored sight to the blind, purged devils from the insane, 
and miraculously raised Lazarus from the dead? In fact, the first hospital 
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serving the general public was founded in 390 AD by a wealthy Christian 
woman, Fabiola (d. 399). As a new and spirited convert, she decided to 
sell all her worldly possessions to provide medical care for the sick and 
poor (Carrick, 2001, p. 224; Porter, 1996, p. 208) in an organized institu­
tional setting. Hence, caring for the sick, lame, and hurting within a 
redemptive framework of belief created a pathway for the religious indi­
vidual to simultaneously redeem herself from sin and also attend to 'the 
least of these', as the Christian Gospels command (e.g., Matthew 25: 
31-46).
As for the funding of these early Christian hospitals, we know that by 
the fourth century they were supported by various bishops and other 
operatives from within the early Christian church in addition to some 
members of the landed aristocracy (Miller, 2004, pp.1184-5 passim). 
Moreover, prior to the establishment of these first hospitals, by the 
fourth century AD Christian guest houses, also called 'hospices', were 
founded (Miller, 2004, p. 1184). These places of refuge were usually 
overseen by nuns or assistants who were dedicated to the care and suste­
nance of the poor, sick, or weary traveller. But hospices were not specifi­
cally providers of medical care. This fact distinguishes them from the 
later Christian hospitals which were generally overseen by at least one 
doctor (iatros) Yet hospices and later hospitals were both supported by 
the church and by donations from wealthier Roman families, and by oth­
ers who were able to contribute something for their life-affirming ser­
vices and care. Hence, it is fair to conclude that the redemptive impulse 
was a leading motivational factor for those who established, supported, 
and administered both hospices and hospitals during the late Roman 
Empire.
But was there an even earlier forerunner to both the early Christian 
hospital and its institutional predecessor, the hospice? Indeed so, the 
pagan temples of the Greek physician-god, Asclepius. A famous exam­
ple still stands in ruins at Epidaurus on mainland Greece; it was built 
around 450 BC and operated until at least 395 AD. These religious temples 
(asklepieia), of which over 400 were built during Pre-Christian antiquity, 
once dotted the ancient landscape from Olympia to Constantinople 
(modern day Istanbul). Funding for the Aesclepian temples generally 
came from one of two sources: patients and their families seeking the 
hypnotic dream-sleep cure (incubation) for one of their own; or wealthy 
families seeking to fulfil their felt sense of civic virtue. In addition, there 
were probably occasional contributions from nearby sponsoring Greek 
city-states.
The physician-God Asclepius, son of Apollo, was said to have had the 
power to rescue the sick from the jaws of death, and make whole the ill 
and lame. But from the rational, non-superstitious perspective of tradi­
tional Hippocratic medicine — grounded on the humoral theory of dis­
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ease according to which a proper balance of the four humors assured the 
patient's good health —these Aesclepian temples were at best last ditch 
centres of care for those judged to be incurable. Therefore, hopeless, ter­
minally ill patients often turned to supernatural Aesclepian remedies 
when the Hippocratic physicians judged that there was nothing more 
they could reasonably do. Can anyone doubt that these often desperate, 
religiously inspired patients, and their similarly inspired, well inten- 
tioned Aesclepian priests—who sometimes dressed in flowing robes in 
imitation of the god—both experienced some redemptive grace as they 
sought heaven's divine cure? Whatever the outcome of this mystical 
God-centred therapy, votive offerings and payments were received by 
the Aesclepian healers from the suffering patient and her family. Thus, it 
is safe to conclude that a sense of redemption (and a wished-for spiritual 
and bodily wholeness) was involved in the funding and support of these 
renowned pagan health care centres, too.
The Utilitarian Motive and Funding Military Medicine
Alongside religious temples and related medical sites associated with 
the Greek god Asclepius, the Roman Empire saw fit to erect special infir­
maries (valetudianaria) dedicated exclusively to soldiers. For example, it 
was well recognized by the Roman Senate that soldiers who were 
wounded in battle or faced other potential health emergencies needed 
immediate care. 'A standard military hospital plan evolved', according 
to Roy Porter, which had'... individual cells off a long corridor, a large 
top-lit hall, latrines and baths' (Porter, 1999, p. 78). In contrast, the more 
affluent Roman citizen would usually receive medical care not in a hos­
pital but at the private house of his physician. Yet the poor and destitute 
would be lucky to hobble or drag themselves to a religious shrine hoping 
for some sort of miracle. Thus, for all but the military, the medical mar­
ketplace of the Roman Empire was strictly speaking a laissez-faire situa­
tion and most uneven in its distribution of medical services to the hoi 
polloi.
Furthermore, the warrior-centred infirmaries were especially crucial 
in helping to fortify the military strength of Rome's legionaries stationed 
along the northern borders—where barbarians began to take a deadly 
toll beginning in the fourth century especially (Miller, 2004, p. 1184). But 
if so, how could one fairly describe the political and strategic motivation 
of Rome (and later, many other countries) in creating and funding such 
strategically placed military hospitals?
In essence, I would argue that this motivation may be fairly called 
'utilitarian.' That is, a person, group, or institution is carrying out a par­
ticular action or plan because, at bottom, it is believed to be helpful to 
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securing the common good of all.5 So here generals and politicians, 
under pressure from repeated waves of barbarian attacks, came to see 
that their society as a whole would benefit if soldiers (injured, or threat­
ened in battle, or otherwise at risk of losing their strength in war) were 
provided competent medical care (relative to those times). Hence, these 
soldiers could be restored to the task of defending their communities as 
rapidly and efficiently as possible. What I am suggesting, then, is that 
Rome funded military infirmaries (as did the French during the Napole­
onic Wars, as did the federal Congress during the American Civil 
War—the examples are endless) precisely because Rome realized that 
trained and experienced soldiers were valuable state assets. These 
human assets could do more effective work for the greater glory of the 
whole society if they had doctors and other medical assistants at their 
disposal when weakened or threatened by disease or wounds. In short, 
publicly funded military infirmaries had social utility: they were useful 
and productive medical institutions operated for the optimal benefit of 
the state, its soldiers, and its citizens —all things considered.
[5] By using the term 'utilitarian', I mean this in the pre-philosophical, naive sense of 
that word. I am not here referring to classical utilitarianism associated with the 
hedonic calculus famously authored by the nineteenth century English social 
reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and his philosophical disciple, J.S. Mill
Furthermore, centuries later in the modern British Isles, the English 
medical doctor James Lind (1716-94) observed that 'armies had lost 
"more of their men by sickness than by the sword", especially through 
unsanitary camp conditions' (Porter, 1999, p. 294). In addition, the Scots­
man and physician-general of the British Army, John Pringle 
(1707-1782), scientifically corroborated Lind's insight by publishing 
Observations on the Diseases of the Army (1752). In it, Pringle stressed 
methods by which troops could adopt practical measures of hygiene in 
order to prevent the most common battlefield diseases such as typhus, 
dysentery, bilious fever, scabies, etc. Porter gives this estimate of the 
impact of Pringle's Observations:
While not strikingly original, it captured the Enlightenment concern for 
hygiene, public health, and the value of life. Pringle is also remembered for 
developing the idea of the neutrality of the military hospital. At the battle of 
Dettingen (1743), he proposed to the French commanding officer that the hos­
pital tents on each side should be immune from the attack. The idea stuck 
(Porter, 1999, pp. 294-5).
Are there other instructive examples of the utilitarian motive driving 
state policy in favour of medical care or medical experimenta­
tion—especially for those in the military? Examples abound: it is well 
established that medical insights and innovative surgeries, procedures, 
and therapies are often invented and tested in the crucible of war. For 
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example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, military 
personnel were among the first to benefit from programs of mass inocu­
lations. These followed discoveries by Jenner, Pasteur, Koch, and others 
that such techniques could be effective in protecting against a myriad of 
infectious diseases. Indeed, this was one of the more humanitarian and 
dramatic benefits of discovering the germ theory.
For example, during the Boer War of 1899-1902, the British army suf­
fered many disease-related casualties. Immunisation against typhoid 
was discovered by Almroth Wright (1861-1947) in 1897. Yet few British 
soldiers received the vaccinations due to irregular state policies that 
were in place at the time. This was tragic. Porter clarifies that in the South 
African theatre of the Boer War, 13,000 soldiers were killed by typhoid, 
whereas 8,000 actually died in battle (Porter, 1999, p. 443). As a result of 
this emergency, the British government formed a special commission to 
study diseases related to war casualties. Thereafter, in 1913, it adopted a 
policy of vaccinating all soldiers sent abroad against infectious diseases, 
including typhoid fever. In point of fact, during the Boer War, the inci­
dence of illness from typhoid fever was around 10%. In contrast, after 
being vaccinated, the incidence of typhoid among British troops during 
World War I (1914-18) dropped to around 2% (Porter, 1999, p. 443).
Also, tetanus was known to be a particularly dangerous disease for 
soldiers, with the death rate of those infected usually standing at above 
40%. So, by the beginning of World War I, decisive public health mea­
sures were taken to protect the troops against tetanus. In general, this 
disease had been especially hard on soldiers. The causal agent, later 
identified as tetanospasmin, is a toxin secreted by the bacterium 
Clostridium tetani which lives in the soil. Hence, when a soldier was 
wounded, very typically 'the bacillus entered the body through gaping 
shell wounds. [But] from 1915 [on], practically every wounded soldier 
received the antitoxin, and so tetanus was dramatically reduced' (Por­
ter, 1999, p. 443). Again, the utilitarian motive to provide competent and 
immediate medical care for the military is seen to produce the best out­
comes by helping to fortify the defences of a nation as a whole, whether 
at war or at peace. And there were other social dividends. Civilian popu­
lations in Britain and elsewhere were eventually protected by vaccina­
tions, too, in medicine's fight against the ravages of typhoid, tetanus, 
and other lethal diseases.
The Prudential Motive and Funding Quarantines
History records few things to be as frightening, alien, and disorienting to 
human communities and their governments as the large scale public 
health scourges known as epidemics. Epidemics may be defined as 'con­
centrated outbursts of infectious or non-infectious disease, often with 
unusually high mortality, affecting relatively large numbers of people 
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within fairly narrow limits of time and space' (Evans, 2004, p. 789). The 
most catastrophic epidemic in the entire history of Europe occurred dur­
ing medieval times, spreading from rats to people, between 1347-51.1 
am referring to the Bubonic plague. It is also called the Black Death due 
to the telltale dark blotches that appeared on the faces of the doomed just 
prior to their deaths. Shockingly, in just over three years, this pestilence 
wiped out approximately twenty million people, about one quarter of 
the entire population of Europe and the Mediterranean (Porter, 1999, 
p. 123). It appeared episodically thereafter, too, arousing great fear and 
consternation, but never with such sweeping force.
The Black Death likely originated in China. Then, from central Asia, it 
spread via the Tatars to Italian merchants who were fighting the infected 
Tatars for preferred trade routes in the Crimea. In returning to their 
native Italy, the plague travelled with these Italian merchant-soldiers, 
breaking out first in Messina and then in Genoa. So virulent was the 
plague that most died within three days of being infected. Typically, the 
most vulnerable included peasant families and the indigent poor. Even 
without contracting such catastrophic epidemics, their average age at 
death in 1400 was not much over 30 years (Porter, 1999, pp.122-127 pas­
sim). And the unenviable truth is that these unfortunates were often left 
to rot in their own bodily fluids when they were ordered to be involun­
tarily quarantined. This happened in towns including Milan and Vienna 
during the most deadly outbreaks of the plague. Moreover, relatively 
few townspeople were lucky enough to flee in advance of these 
scourges: there was little advance warning and few alternative destina­
tions seemed safe. Hence, in trying to survive this fourteenth century 
public health catastrophe, governments acted to protect themselves and 
their citizens in ways that were barely rational (by contemporary stan­
dards) and, from hindsight, often tragic, heartless, and futile.
To be sure, there were many factual misunderstandings about the true 
nature of the plague that made most medical and governmental 
responses ineffective. For one thing, the prevailing theory of health at 
that time was still the Hippocratic humoral theory, with significant 
refinements by Galen (AD 129-c. 216). This theory stated that if a person 
becomes ill with an epidemic disease or any other malady it was at least 
partly his or her own fault. Such vulnerability to disease was likely due 
to some weakness or imbalance of one's four humors over which indi­
viduals have some rational control through proper diet, exercise, and 
sound hygiene. Following this logic, healthy people did not normally 
get sick; and if they did they were probably responsible for it on some 
level.
In addition, alongside the humoral theory there was a correlative 
environmentally-based theory known as the miasmic theory of disease 
(miasma was considered to be foul or polluted air). It held that conta­
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gions arise from the stench of swamps, waste, and other rotting organic 
debris. Humans breathed in this putrid air and so it tended to make us 
sick—disturbing our internal humoral balance. More alarmingly, it was 
widely held that once a person becomes infected with the plague, others 
can acquire the disease just by touching that person or by standing in his 
immediate vicinity. In addition, besides this pair of naturalistic theories 
of disease (humoral and miasmic),6 there was still the influential super­
natural theory of disease held by Christians and other mystics. This the­
ory construed illness, and especially pestilence, as something sent by 
God to punish sinning humanity. Therefore, this supernatural view of 
disease only exacerbated the public's personal sense of panic, guilt, 
self-loathing, and despair.
[6] One recalls that the humoral theory, according to which disease occurred when 
one of the four humors (yellow bile, black bile, blood, phlegm) became excessive, 
was completely overtaken by the germ theory by around 1880. The competing 
miasmic theory held sway even later, until gradually losing ground to Koch's 
bacteriological model of disease by the late nineteenth century.
[7] The bacterial cause of the Black Death was subsequently discovered in 1894 
during the Hong Kong epidemic by Japanese scientists A.Yersin and S. Kitasato. 
By 1898, the French epidemiologist P. L. Simond showed that the transmission of 
the bacillus, Yersinia pestis, was communicated from rats to humans via fleas: a 
single bite from an infected flea could be fatal (Rosen, 1958, p. 324).
As a result of these theories of disease, citizens were sometimes 
advised by local governmental authorities to evacuate their cities and 
towns in advance of the relentless plague which, in fact, was caused (we 
now know) by flea-infested rats.7 In addition, local governments in Italy, 
France, Germany, and elsewhere enacted involuntary 'quarantines' 
(this term derived from the Biblical quarantenaria meaning forty days) 
against all those travellers and ships known to have originated from 
ports or cities already infected by the plague (Porter, 1999, p.126). Local 
governments also set up health boards in cities including Milan, Flor­
ence, and Lucca. Also, they closed their borders if at all possible against 
outsiders thought to be infected. In some cities, like Milan, they involun­
tarily quarantined and sealed their own plague-infected citizens in their 
own homes, leaving them to die. Both doctors and priests, who were 
entrusted to care for the sick or perform Last Rites, also sometimes fled 
for their lives in sheer terror of what might happen to them if they 
remained behind to perform their official duties.
Therefore, as we have just seen, one of the most commonly used, pub­
licly funded methods of restoring health and preventing disease, was 
the state's deployment of the quarantine. Typically, this restrictive mea­
sure could be applied to seaports or roads, halting shipping or com­
merce; or to individuals and their families, limiting their freedom to 
come and go as they pleased in their homes or neighbourhoods. Hence, 
the method of quarantine—however unfairly, unevenly or unnecessar­
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ily applied in the fourteenth century—arguably embodied a prudent 
method of rationally imposing preventive medicine measures on citi­
zens (and strangers) with the goal of stopping the spread of this unfor­
giving Black Death. (Again, the plague was thought to be a disease 
transmissible by contact with the miasmic breath, or through touching 
the open sores or even normal-looking skin of real or imagined victims 
who were thought to be exposed to the contagion).
In sum, I think it is fair to conclude that a 'prudential motive' was 
almost certainly at work in the decision to use state funds in deploying 
the restrictive measures of quarantine. These funds were needed to 
mount naval blockades of docks and ports, and to pay those workers 
involved in identifying, apprehending, and enforcing involuntary 
restrictions and other cordone sanitare for those suspected of being 
infected. In general, a person, group, or institution may be said to be act­
ing from a prudential motive when their resulting behaviour shows evi­
dence of skilful selection, adaptation, or use of an appropriate means to a 
desired end.8 Here, the desired end was halting the spread of the 
bubonic plague by skilfully using a means that conformed to the best 
medical thinking of the day. Unlike the 'utilitarian motive', cited earlier, 
the prudential motive does not require the actor to contemplate the more 
universal consideration of what constitutes the common good of society. 
Instead, prudential acts merely involve a scaled back, lower-order focus 
on what seems more or less appropriate to the situation at hand here and 
now. Thus, the scope of awareness (what I call the 'epistemic scope') of a 
prudentially motivated act is somewhat less encompassing than its utili­
tarian counterpart in the long run.9
The Charitable Motive and Funding Inoculations
Who can doubt that a fourth type of motivation, what I am here calling 
the'charitable motivation', is also involved in carrying out humane acts 
of medical care? The charitable impulse has deep historical roots. We 
observe the author of the Hippocratic treatise Precepts, who practised 
medicine in Athens during the first century BC, admonishing his fellow 
physicians thusly: 'And if there be an opportunity to serving one who is 
a stranger in financial straits, give full assistance to all such. For where 
there is love of man, there is also love of the art' (Precepts 6; quoted in
] My definition is modified slightly from the Webster's Third New International 
t Dictionary (1965, p. 1824), to include the Aristotelian notion of 'appropriate' 
choice. Hence, the prudent motive leads to actions that are moral, not merely 
clever. Such actions, following Aristotle (384-322 BC), ultimately involve the 
larger issue of determining what is good for man. See also Copleston (1962, Vol. 1, 
Part 2, p. 86).
| The possible objection that this scope of awareness may be more a matter of 
degree than kind is discussed in the penultimate section of this paper, below. 
30 Distributing Health Care
Carrick, 2001, p. xviii). Indeed, one can hear in these distant words a 
commitment to the importance of empathy and charity in the treating of 
the outsider, the sick, and the destitute. What's more, the Homeric tales 
of Zeus, Dionysus, and Artemus, among other Olympians, fostered an 
awareness in the pagan mind that the gods themselves could appear 
incarnate as human strangers in need. So it would be wise to greet the 
stranger in need carefully but never meanly.
Nor can one ignore that a selfless response to the suffering of the 
stranger is affirmed both in the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Gospels. 
While charity is a Christian virtue endorsed in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, Jewish tradition also affirms the importance of compassion 
toward those in need, as the story Jonah and the whale affirms. This type 
of other-centred, charitable motivation is characterized by a deeply felt 
impulse to extend a helping hand: to succour the sick and broken with a 
saving, caring touch.
Formally defined, 'charitable motivations' are those evidenced by a 
kindly and sympathetic disposition aimed at rendering aid to the needy 
or suffering.10 Such acts typically involve freely giving to others goods or 
services of value that could otherwise have been withheld. In addition, it 
is interesting to recall that the eighteenth century German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) regarded acts of charity as imperfect 
duties.11 That is, properly speaking, such acts may never be morally 
required of another as would, by comparison, such perfect duties (in 
Kantian language) as the repayment of a personal loan. Again, perfect 
duties are always obligatory duties for Kant, never optional. And so, for 
Kant, as for most of us living in the twenty-first century, charitable acts 
such as sending money to the International Red Cross for food relief in 
Sri Lanka are praiseworthy but strictly speaking optional. They cannot 
in the ordinary sense be morally required.
[10] Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1965), p. 378, hereafter WID. 
'Charity' derives from the Late Latin word 'caritas', meaning Christian love. 
Webster's defines the latter as: 'the virtue or act of loving God with a love which 
transcends that for creatures; loving others for the sake of God' (WID, 1965, p. 378, 
my emphasis).
[11] Kant, I. (1875,1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks).
But is this really a fair description of charitable acts in the context of 
contemporary medical care? Yes and no. For while one may not requirea 
physician in private practice in the United States, say, to donate his or 
her medical services to the needy poor, there are acknowledged limits to 
the exercise of such professional options. For example, it is a recognized! 
medical and moral duty not to cause (or allow by acts of omission) some­
one who is penniless to die on the front door of one's clinic just because 
they cannot afford emergency medical services. Again, if life-saving aid 
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that could have been rendered was in point of fact withheld, would this 
heartless inaction not be widely and justifiably condemned? Moreover, 
since for Kant charitable acts also conform to the moral law (what he 
called the 'Categorical Imperative') — according to which persons ought 
to be treated as ends in themselves, never as mere means — charitable 
acts are in any event exemplary and praiseworthy.
To summarise, we may observe in these persistent religious, scientific, 
and humanistic traditions —from Hippocratic precepts, to Judeo- 
Christian scriptures, to Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant —an 
implicit affirmation of the importance of the charitable impulse as a nec­
essary condition for membership in the moral community. I dare say 
this humane tendency to consider the safety and welfare of the other is 
one of the enduring legacies of our ancient and modern past embodied 
at least in part in our own age by social workers and health care profes­
sionals, plus the government agencies and taxpayers who tacitly agree 
to fund and facilitate their good works.
In addition, within the ethos and norms of the public health move­
ment as it arose from roughly the eighteenth century to our own day, 
charitable acts may include providing bandages, prescription medi­
cines, crutches, inoculations, surgical procedures, pure drinking water, 
fresh linen, etc., at little or no direct cost to the recipient. Indeed, with the 
gradual acceptance of Louis Pasteur's (1822-96) germ theory by about 
1875, and the gradual adoption of Robert Koch's (1843-1910) bacterio­
logical model of disease about twenty-five years later, doctors, medical 
researchers, and public health officials were increasingly encouraged by 
the promising social and health implications of these stunning scientific 
breakthroughs. Hence, during the nineteenth century when it came to 
using public or private funds with the end in view of restoring or pre­
serving the health of the masses, government officials began to push for 
a variety of preventive medicine measures. Perhaps chief among the 
more controversial of these measures was the deployment of public 
inoculation programmes. To be sure, inoculations were attempted, at 
various times, to thwart a variety of deadly diseases including cholera, 
smallpox, diphtheria, and malaria. (Inoculations were later called 'vac­
cinations', once specific vaccines were developed containing the immu­
nising antigens or micro-organisms which were then injected). In fact, 
Rosen states that the method of inoculation was known to healers 
throughout the world at least since the early 1700s, and probably earlier 
in the East and Orient (Rosen, 1958, p. 184). As a technique, it became 
established in medical circles under the simple-sounding principle, 
'Like cures like.'
For example, it was known to some midwives and others that expo­
sure of a non-infected person to a series of weakened (attenuated) doses 
of a pathogen, say, measles, somehow had the power to render that 'in- 
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oculated' person immune from the very disease to which she had been 
intentionally exposed (Rosen, 1958, p. 183). While inoculation was an 
extremely useful method,12 many in England and elsewhere during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were sceptical. They worried, not 
altogether without justification in the early days of the technique, that 
those exposed to excessive or corrupted doses of the allegedly life-sav­
ing pathogens might somehow grow ill and die. As we saw in our earlier 
account of the bubonic plague, these horrific epidemics were capable of 
wiping out whole generations: labourers, farmers, merchants, crafts­
man, sailors, the landed gentry —none were spared. Philosophically, 
most adults came to realize that all people were in some sense true 
equals before the onslaught of these unyielding scourges. Predictably, 
as the techniques of inoculation and vaccine development became more 
efficient and reliable—thanks to the early efforts against smallpox by 
researchers like Edward Jenner in 1796, and over a century-and-a 
half-later against polio by researchers like Jonas Salk in 1953 — the pub­
lic's scepticism and resistance against inoculation programs slowly gave 
way to guarded acceptance.13
[12] Specifically, smallpox inoculation was known as 'variolation', although the term 
is now rarely used.
[13] Even now, this acceptance is somewhat fragile and wont to slip: witness the 
suspicion of the combined measles, mumps, and rubella inoculation in the UK in 
the late 1990s, that grew from a study linking the vaccine to serious side-effects. 
Despite the study being roundly and openly discredited at the time by the 
broader scientific community, these suspicions lingered for some time.
Of course, these inoculation programs were actually not free but were 
usually funded by governments or, in some cases, supported by the 
emerging health care professions, or by monies donated by pioneering 
medical researchers and their sponsoring labs and institutes. Such pro­
grams were initially, at least, cast as charitable programs for the 
improvement of the health and welfare of the poor. This preventive 
medicine trend gradually spread across Europe as the method of inocu­
lation became perfected, and as the science and clinical evidence back­
ing it up gradually won both scientific and popular acceptance by the 
middle of the nineteenth century.
In fact, it was in England, with the publication in 1798 of Edward Jen­
ner's paper, 'An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae 
Vaccinae ... [Known as] Cow pox', that the efficacy of using vaccines in 
the process of inoculation was established. Jenner, a country doctor and 
clergyman's son who studied in London under John Hunter, was one of 
the first medical scientists to endorse the widespread use of inoculations 
in his fight against smallpox (Rosen, 1958, p. 188ff; Porter, 1999, 
p. 274ff.). To Jenner's remarkable achievement we now turn.
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Rosen reminds us that, during Jenner's lifetime (1749-1823), smallpox 
was one of the most feared diseases in Europe and America —a leading 
cause of death. 'It smouldered endemically in city and town, flaring up 
recurrently into epidemic outbreaks ... According to William Douglas, 
writing in 1760, smallpox was a chief cause of the high infant mortality in 
Europe' (Rosen, 1958, p.184). Porter adds: ' "The speckled monster" had 
become virulent throughout Europe, responsible in bad years for per­
haps a tenth of all deaths; Queen Mary of England (1662-94) died of it, as 
did Louis XV (1710-74) of France' (Porter, 1999, pp. 274-75). Thanks 
largely to Jenner's experiments, inoculation caught on as a protective 
measure against smallpox in England, along with preventive medicine 
programs against other deadly diseases, by 1900. Even so, there were 
still those who held out. For example, some of the Calvinists in Scotland 
resisted inoculation on grounds that rendering a patient immune 
through human intervention interfered with Divine Providence. In con­
trast, the philosophes in France, including Voltaire (1694-1778), endorsed 
inoculations as a boon to mankind; the practice was officially endorsed 
by the French government in 1750.
Back in England, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762), the wife 
of a British consul in Constantinople, was a forceful early advocate. In 
fact, she decided to have her five-year-old daughter inoculated against 
smallpox in London, in 1721. This she did after having observed a few 
years earlier a somewhat cruder form of the technique used by peasant 
women in Turkey (Porter, 1999, p. 275; Rosen, 1958, p. 186). Across the 
seas, in Colonial America, the clergyman Cotton Mather (1663-1728) 
was also a strong advocate of inoculation. '[H]e knew about suffering, 
having had to watch as two wives and thirteen of his fifteen children 
succumbed to disease' (Porter, 1999, p. 175).
To clarify, the immediate aim of smallpox inoculation was to induce a 
mild dose of the disease in a non-infected person, thereby conferring 
lifelong immunity without causing unsightly pock-marking or any 
other harmful consequence (Porter, 1999, p. 275). Before he began his 
experiments that led to the groundbreaking development of an effective 
smallpox vaccine, Jenner was familiar with traditional inoculations. In 
performing them, he aimed to infect his subjects with weakened doses of 
the smallpox material in order to confer immunity. In the process of per­
forming traditional inoculation, Jenner noticed something odd: those 
subjects who had earlier contracted cowpox—a disease of cattle occa­
sionally contracted by humans — had evidenced no reaction whatsoever 
to his traditional smallpox inoculation. That is, they appeared to be 
immune to smallpox.
But Jenner did not feel confident with his observation. So, remember­
ing the challenging words of his professor, John Hunter, 'Why not ... 
experiment?', Jenner decided to test his hypothesis. What if the cowpox 
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had properties that could be developed into a vaccine that would render 
subjects immune to smallpox?
In 1796, an opportunity to try out this idea presented itself. Jenner inoculated 
a boy, James Phipps, with cowpox matter taken from the hand of a milkmaid, 
Sarah Nelmes, who had acquired the infection naturally. Then after several 
weeks he inoculated the boy with smallpox, but it failed to take—James 
Phipps was immune to smallpox. (Rosen, 1958, p. 188).
Ironically, when Jenner first tried to present the result of his experiment 
to the Royal Society, he was refused. Soon thereafter, however, his 
results were accepted in 1798 under a more modest title. Within just 
three years, his 'Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae 
Vaccinae' received widespread attention in Continental Europe and 
America. In fact, it was published in a third edition by 1801, and went 
into Latin, German, French, American, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese 
editions by 1803 (Porter, 1999, pp. 276-77).
To the layperson, the often missed epidemiological significance of 
Jenner's contribution is that while smallpox was fatal to humans, cow­
pox was benign. Therefore, if Jenner were able to develop a vaccine from 
the cowpox material, the inoculation process would in this case be mea­
surably safer. Moreover, if his hypothesis proved correct, a successful 
cowpox vaccine could then be developed in larger quantities, and dis­
pensed to more subjects more cheaply and efficiently than the tradi­
tional inoculation. For the latter technique did not strictly speaking 
require vaccination at all; mere exposure, through whatever medium, 
would do. In addition, things could run amok using traditional inocula­
tion. For one thing, the inoculated person could sometimes contract the 
full disease from the attenuated dosage if the quantities were too potent 
or the exposures were too frequent, and die. Second, if the aim was to 
inoculate large numbers of people there was a substantially greater risk 
that something could go wrong with the quantity and quality of the 
materia medica of the dosages themselves since the chemistries were not 
that well understood.
No doubt a lasting hallmark of the practical significance of Jenner's 
discovery of the smallpox vaccine is the greater confidence it inspired 
toward the medical community itself among the people whose lives he 
and others helped to save through the deployment of massive and often 
charitable vaccination programs. At first, this was the case for smallpox 
but later for a long list of deadly diseases that were defeated or resisted 
via the vaccination process which Jenner helped develop and perfect. In 
so doing, Jenner may also be said to have laid the initial groundwork for 
the science of immunology. Indeed, once Jenner's vaccination tech­
niques gained currency, his discoveries were further confirmed in 1800 
by Harvard Medical School's first professor of physic, Benjamin Water­
house (1754-1846). Waterhouse published his own confirmation under 
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the title, 'A prospect of exterminating the smallpox" (Rosen, 1958, 
p. 189). In addition, President Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) became an 
active supporter of Waterhouse, arguing forcefully for public vaccina­
tion programs as a civic imperative (Rosen, 1958, p. 189). Connecting the 
motive of charity to Jenner's scientific breakthrough, Rosen states that a 
benefactor by the name of Valentine Seaman was the first advocate of 
mass vaccination in America. In 1802, Seaman originated in New York 
the 'Institute for Inoculation .." the main purpose of which was to fur­
nish inoculations free of charge to the poor (Rosen, 1958, p. 189). In Eng­
land, over 5000 individuals had been vaccinated by 1799 alone. The 
practice was deemed so important in Sweden that it was made compul­
sory. In contrast, compulsory vaccination was resisted for a time in Eng­
land for fear the rights of individuals would be trampled by the state 
(Porter, 1999, p. 277; Rosen, 1958, pp. 189-90). The situation in Germany 
was arguably even more progressive.
The German government briefly explored the idea of 'Medical Police', 
a term meant to convey the need for a government administered pro­
gram of health protection for all citizens. Its principal proponent was 
Johann Peter Frank (1748-1821) who wrote a six volume work on this 
topic which was published between 1779-1819. But the project never 
really reached fruition until after 1871 when a central department of 
public health came into being. By 1883, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
(1815-1898) introduced for the first time a system of medical social 
insurance. 'Bismarck's system became a model for other European coun­
tries, including Britain' (Chave, 1986, pp. 8-9). In France, Napoleon 
(1761-1821) was so taken in by the seeming miracle of defeating small­
pox by Jenner's technique that he ordered his entire army vaccinated. He 
is further reported to have said: 'Anything Jenner wants shall be 
granted' (Porter, 1999, p. 277). Not to be outdone, in 1802, the English 
Parliament awarded Jenner a prize of £10,000. Just a year later, in 1803, 
the Royal Jennerian Society was founded. Its prime aim was to promote 
vaccination for the masses as part of a charitable and humane program. 
Indeed, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, rulers in Europe and 
elsewhere embraced the general dictum that the promotion of health 
was essential to a well functioning state (Porter, 1999, p. 277).
Summary: Four Motives Supportive of Public Health
I began this paper by conjecturing that any effort to pursue a unified psy­
chological, sociological, or philosophical explanation for that most 
remarkable of human practices, namely, the decision of governments, 
institutions, or groups to use public or private funds in order to succour 
the sick or make whole the injured, would almost certainly face treacher­
ous seas. Based on the evidence gathered here, I submit that this conjec­
ture has so far been confirmed.
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But while a unified, monolithic account of the public or private fund­
ing of health care has eluded our capture, what we have discovered dur­
ing this voyage has in some ways proved more instructive. We have 
discovered a broad, multifaceted account that accommodates a wider 
range of historical periods and governing philosophies than any single 
explanatory principle would likely do. Why would a single explanatory 
principle not fly? Because, as should be evident from the present sketch 
drawn from 2500 years of social history, things are just not that tidy in 
the chronicles of Western governments and in the diaries of the common 
people over which they ruled. Hence, despite the fact that no unifying 
raison d'etre has emerged to account for the seemingly altruistic behav­
iour that lead to the public or private funding of health care, this result is 
hardly cause for despair.
In point of fact, we have identified and characterised at least four criti­
cally important human motivations that are often involved in preserv­
ing, restoring, or enhancing the health and well-being of citizens. These 
action-guiding elements include the redemptive, utilitarian, prudential, 
and charitable motives. Furthermore, any one or more of these motives 
qualifies as sufficient conditions. That is, when present they tend to func­
tion as contributing causes psychologically and morally in almost any 
decision-making process that leads individuals, groups, institutions, or 
governments to actually fund health care for the masses (at whatever 
level of funding). Thus, by being made more aware of the necessary con­
ditions involved in this decision-making process, we have come closer 
to a fuller understanding of the tableau of human impulses, volitions, 
and choices that encourage such other-directed, socially conscious pro­
jects as those associated with what is now widely called the public health 
movement.
Objection and Reply: Oversimplifying Choice and Action?
Nevertheless, some may object that the picture I have just painted com­
mits the fallacy of oversimplication.14 This it allegedly does because the 
four motives which I have explicated as more or less discrete concepts in 
our four central illustrations — the funding of hospitals, military medi­
cine, quarantines, and inoculations — may sometimes overlap with each 
other. But, as I will show, this objection is hardly fatal. In fact, properly 
understood, it reminds us that some apparent impediments from the 
logical point of view turn out to be little more than instructive mirages 
when viewed from the right angle, i.e., with a deeper understanding, in 
this instance, of how language and thought actually work together.
[14] An earlier version of this objection was suggested to me by Niall Maclean. The 
core fallacy is of course committed when one takes a complex thing and construes 
it to be much simpler than it really is.
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So let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that the preceding objec­
tion is correct: our four motives do sometimes overlap in their 
action-guiding capacities. Hence, suppose that what I have described as 
the'charitable motive' to give aid to the needy by funding inoculations, 
may at times overlap with the 'redemptive motive'. Thus, the redemp­
tive motive, too, may impel an actor to accomplish the same end out of 
(in this case) a basic love of God. Does the fact that one or more of these 
motives may overlap undermine all that we have come to understand so 
far?
Not at all. If anything, the fact that these four motives may occasion­
ally overlap invites us to ask a critical question, one with illuminating 
implications for how the human mind, choice, and volition shape indi­
vidual or institutional conduct in what some call the phenomenology of 
action. Is it realistic to assume that the diverse impulses and motives at 
work as we experience ourselves and others in the world, and as we act 
on things in the world to accomplish desired ends, are in fact as rigidly 
distinct as we sometimes imagine them to be? In short, is the existential 
and psychological process of deliberation and decision-making messier 
than we imagine?
In my view, the only honest answer is yes. We often talk as (/concepts 
and motives are more rigid and discrete than they really are. But why? 
We do so, I suggest, mainly as a short-hand technique by which we may 
more conveniently and efficiently negotiate the world. This technique 
includes, at the highest deliberative levels of government, the orchestra­
tion of the collective motives and agendas of diverse political constitu­
ents needed to build a consensus aimed at establishing sound health 
care policies within democratic societies. As a result of these practical 
insights, social habits, and collective capacities, we do not have to spell 
out everything that we are experiencing in tedious, time-consuming 
detail in order to get things done in our households, communities, or 
nation states.
In addition, I conjecture that neither the worlds we regularly mediate 
and describe through the multiple lens of language, nor the higher-order 
concepts that anchor our action-guiding motives and impulses within 
the common ethos of our natural languages, behave in the artificially 
rigid and inflexible ways we sometimes imagine. In fact, based on my 
own observations, I would argue that the discrete, action-guiding 
motives we have been exploring (the redemptive, utilitarian, pruden­
tial, and charitable motives) do, in fact 'give'; that is, they do indeed 
'overlap' and 'interpenetrate' in the mind of the actor. Again, this hap­
pens especially when they converge on common ends that are deemed 
worthy of execution by citizens, institutions, or governments. Further­
more, our four central motives behave in this flexible, overlapping man­
ner precisely because, at bottom, they turn out to be conceptually related 
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in an interesting, suggestive way. That is, they bear what could be called 
a family resemblance to one another.15 If so, as members of the same 
loosely related conceptual family (to be named below), is it so surprising 
that our four leading motives may overlap in various contexts?
[15] By using the phrase 'family resemblance', I am adapting Wittgenstein's 
terminology. My simple point is that these four motives—the redemptive, 
utilitarian, prudential, and charitable—may, in fact, share no easily identifiable 
common characteristic. Yet, like members of a human family who may not look 
much like one another individually but are nevertheless recognisable as bearing a 
similar family resemblance or orientation, we likewise notice the shared 
relatedness of these four motives. This we do because they often appear in similar 
contexts and behave in similar ways (often moving us toward acts or programs 
that assist others). See Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), section 67.
[16] A complete theory of action, while outside the scope of this paper, may be found 
in L. Davis's Theory of Action (Davis, 1979).
[17] For a different take on the Hippocratic trad ition of philanthropy, which construes 
occasional pro bono medical care as a clever way for doctors to improve their 
reputations, see Edelstein (1967).
So again, to admit that there is this occasional overlapping of concepts 
hardly spills the wind from our sails. Instead, it usefully serves to 
remind us that as actors, whether legislators, kings, or citizens, our 
motives may sometimes work in concert but also manifest in 'mixed', 
creative, and even contradictory ways. It hardly follows from this that 
the four motives in question have no distinct characteristics, or no 
proper limits of usage. Indeed, as I have suggested, they may be flexible, 
overlapping, yet more or less discrete—without conceptual embarrass­
ment or loss of explanatory power in any robust theory of human 
action.16 Hence, the objection from oversimplification need not foul the 
lines of our analysis any further.
Conclusion: Philanthropy and Funding Public Health
What, then, is the name of the parent concept to which the four central 
motives under investigation may be said to bear a family resemblance? 
One gets a bold hint, I suggest, by reflecting further on the now familiar 
passage of the Hippocratic author of Precepts.
And if there be an opportunity to serving one who is a stranger in financial 
straits, give full assistance to all such. For where there is love of man 
(philanthropia), there is also love of the art.17
If my intuition is right, our four motives, properly speaking, are 
related to the higher-order concept of 'philanthropy'; at its root, it liter­
ally means 'loving mankind' (derived from the Greek philia = love, and 
anthropos = mankind). In contemporary usage, philanthropy may be 
defined as: (1) 'good will toward one's fellow man, especially as 
expressed through active efforts to promote human welfare'; or (2) 'an 
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act or instance of deliberate generosity: a contribution made in the spirit 
of humanitarianism' (Webster's Dictionary, 1965, p. 1697).
I submit that actions arising from the redemptive motive, which seek to 
benefit mankind out of a love of God and so lead quite naturally to the 
funding of hospitals, bear a family resemblance to this parent notion of 
philanthropy (as defined above). So, too, actions arising from the utilitar­
ian motive, which seek to optimise the balance of well-being over misery 
and so lead quite naturally to the funding of military medicine for the 
better defence of the community, also bear a family resemblance to our 
notion of philanthropy. As for the prudential motive, was it not predicated 
on selecting appropriate means to desired ends? Can anyone doubt that, 
even today, the funding of medical quarantines is sometimes the desir­
able thing to do —in order to reduce human suffering and benefit those 
citizens not yet infected? This last consideration also links the prudential 
motive in a familial way to our core notion of philanthropy: however dif­
ficult to enact and enforce, quarantines can and do serve humanitarian 
purposes, too. Lastly, there is the charitable motive. This encourages 
actions aimed at aiding the needy or suffering and so lead quite natu­
rally to the funding of inoculations designed to prevent the spread of 
communicable diseases like smallpox. It also bears an obvious family 
resemblance to our preceding notion of philanthropy.
My final conjecture is that our notion of philanthropy loosely unites 
and subsumes each of our four central motives in at least two interesting 
and parallel ways. First, it interfaces with the redemptive and charitable 
motives by helping us notice that these both aim to generate good will 
and promote human welfare — the former for the glory of God, and the 
later for the sake of the poor. Second, it interfaces with the utilitarian and 
prudential motives by helping us notice that these both aim to promote 
the health of citizens by restoring the national defence and by blocking 
the spread of epidemics — the former for the sake of balancing optimal 
outcomes, the later for the sake of finding appropriate means to wise 
ends. If so, 'philanthropy', as here defined, may be said to constitute a 
basic concept which both links and illuminates the fuller meanings and 
potential psychological powers of the redemptive, utilitarian, pruden­
tial, and charitable motivations as we experience the effects of these 
forces in our lives.
But if this is the case, then I must modify an earlier important claim. 
While it is still true that no monolithic philosophy or care-giving princi­
ple emerges from the historical record to account for why governments, 
religious institutions, or other groups may have decided, over the centu­
ries, to support the funding of health care, it would now be false to con­
clude that there is no unity at all in the four leading motives we have 
identified. What unites them is precisely the humanitarian vision that 
good will toward one's fellow man involves consideration of a 
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higher-order philanthropic imperative. The imperative in question 
asserts that we ought to work to reduce human suffering and promote, 
as generously as possible, the well-being of all citizens. I am calling this 
imperative the philanthropic imperative.
Consider further: If this philanthropic imperative were wholeheart­
edly endorsed by the international community of nations, what would 
happen? If these nations worked openly together to achieve humane 
medical care through cooperative arrangements with each other and 
with such groups such as the World Health Organization, would not the 
funding of sound public health programs tend to flourish on a more 
responsive and extensive global scale than they do today?18
[18] Consistent with at least part of my conclusion, it is interesting to observe that the 
world's largest private philanthropic institution, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, has christened their 'Global Health Initiative' as a current top 
priority. See www.gatesfoundation.org for details.
[19] I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Philip Wilson, a medical historian at 
Pennsylvania State University's College of Medicine, Hershey, PA, for helpful 
criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks, too, to Professor David 
Hufford, Chair, Department of Humanities, and the staff of the George T. Harrell 
Medical Library at Hershey, for arranging guest scholar privileges during the 
2006 summer term.
In my judgment, the answer is yes. At bottom, the international 
endorsement of the philanthropic imperative—which I have here rein­
terpreted as a core value at the heart of any humane program of public 
medicine — would go a long way toward building and sustaining sound 
programs of global health for planet Earth and its many inhabitants well 
into the twenty-first century.19
